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Moreover, I clarify the role abhāvapramā plays in svaprakāśa of the Advaitavedānta school by 
examining Citsukha’s (ca. 13th) Tattvapradīpikā (TP). Similar to the Kh, this work discusses 
abhāvapramā and viparyaya as evidence of vijñāna svaprakāśatā.  By examining Kh and TP, it 
becomes clear that there are parallel arguments in both texts and that in this debate viparyaya and 
abhāvapramā (vyatirekapramā, viparītapramā) are consistent with each other. As a result, I conclude 
that the difference between abhāvapramā and viparyaya is as follows. 
First, if cognition is present and if it is known correctly, then correct knowledge occurs. However, 
if viparyaya occurs when that cognition is not accurately known, then this viparyaya is knowledge that 
is incorrectly recognized as opposed to the content of cognition. On the other hand, when abhāvapramā 
occurs it is unrelated to the content of recognition and cognition that such cognition itself does not exist 
occurs. As described above, the difference between abhāvapramā and viparyaya is whether there is the 
recognition that the content of cognition is incorrect in regards to the cognition of the object, or whether 
it is incorrect knowledge about the presence or absence of cognition.  
As a result of the above considerations, it becomes clear that abhāvapramā in the demonstration 
of svaprakāśa in the Advaitavedānta school is, unlike viparyaya that is related to the recognizing of 
content, the knowledge related to the presence or absence of cognition of the object. Then,  
abhāvapramā is the correct knowledge of the absence of the cognition of subject, but by saying that 
abhāvapramā does not exist, scholars of the Advaitavedānta school tried to claim that cognition that is 
the subject is always present. 
 
Dharmakīrti's interpretation of nigrahasthāna (2): 
On ado
odbhāvana 
SASAKI Ryo 
Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660) defined "the condition of defeat" (nigrahasthāna) — a traditional 
concept in the art of debate — from a totally new viewpoint in his work Vādanyāya (VN). He divided it 
into asādhanā!gavacana, the condition of defeat for proponents, and adoodbhāvana, the condition of 
defeat for opponents. This compels us then to conclude that a proponent is judged to be defeated when 
his behavior corresponds to asādhanā!gavacana and an opponent is judged to be defeated when his 
behavior corresponds to adoodbhāvana, according to the terms of debate set up in the VN. However, 
based on the descriptions supplied in the VN, this conclusion must in fact be wrong. 
The conditions of victory or defeat in debate in the VN should not be clarified only through an 
analysis of asādhanā!gavacana and adoodbhāvana. We have to disentangle the relationship between 
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proponents and opponents in order to understand these conditions. However, there has been no study 
that has tried to abstract and arrange these conditions of victory or defeat. Therefore, this paper aims to 
clarify the entire picture of these conditions and discusses related issues, such as details of 
adoodbhāvana and the form of debate Dharmakīrti intended. 
These conditions of victory and defeat are as follows. First, the proponent states a proof, and the 
proof is then divided into whether it is correct [1] or wrong [2] (i.e., asādhanā!gavacana). When the 
proponent's proof is correct and the opponent does not point out any fault in it (the first interpretation of 
adoodbhāvana), then the proponent is judged to have won and the opponent is considered defeated 
[1-1]. Other conditions may prevail however: [1-2] when the proponent's proof is correct but the 
opponent points out a pseudo-fault in it (the second interpretation of adoodbhāvana); [1-2-1] when the 
proponent is successful in rebutting the pseudo-fault, so the proponent is judged to have won and the 
opponent is considered defeated; and conversely [1-2-2] when the proponent cannot rebut the 
pseudo-fault, so there is no victory or defeat for either party. We also have [2-1] when the proponent's 
proof has some faults and the opponent points out those faults adequately, and thus the opponent is 
judged to have won and the proponent is considered defeated. But for [2-2], even if the proponent's 
proof has some faults, if the opponent does not point out any faults (the first interpretation of 
adoodbhāvana), then neither party is victorious or defeated. Similarly for [2-3], if the proponent's 
proof has some faults and the opponent points out only a pseudo-fault (the second interpretation of 
adoodbhāvana), there is again no victory or defeat for either party. 
In debating, even if the proponent's proof has a fault, the opponent may not necessarily recognize 
the truth, and if the opponent cannot point out the fault adequately, then the proponent is not necessarily 
presenting the correct proof. From the above-stated regulations for victory or defeat, we can see that 
Dharmakīrti's intention is to avoid a situation where if both the proponent and opponent fail to 
recognize the truth, they are judged victorious or defeated. From this intention, we can also comprehend 
Dharmakīrti's view that looking for the truth has priority over victory. Thus, we can conclude that this 
point of view — that the purpose of debate should be to benefit others, including not only the rivals in 
debate but also those in attendance — is reflected in the conditions of victory or defeat outlined in the 
VN. 
 
 
 
